Policies to Avert Stagnation: The Crisis and the Future(s) of the Euro

Mark Blyth
Eastman Professor of Political Economy
Brown University and the Watson Institute for International Studies

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Some Simple Policies to Avoid Stagnation

- Stop Squeezing
- Halt Deflation
- Unblock Credit Channels
- Move beyond Structural Reform
- Build complete institutions

- Maastrict-Austerity -fiscal compact
- Monetary Policy Insufficient, Fiscal Policy Absent
- Means dealing with 1.2t Euro in NPLs
- Move to EU Wide fiscal and debt instruments
- Full financial union, common treasury etc.
And Why That’s Not Going to Happen?

• Stop Squeezing
• Halt Deflation
• Unblock Credit Channels
• Move beyond Structural Reform
• Build complete institutions

• Ideological lock in/admitting failure/killing allies
• CB as only institution with region wide powers
• Who lends more in a recession?
• Necessitates region wide fiscal policy
• Not going to happen
But even if the political will was there, there’s still two problems

**Political Risk**
- The problem of sustaining recovery in the face of counter-productive policy is multiplied when deflation becomes systemic
- **Result:** The hollowing-out of the party systems that have made the EU possible

**Economic Risk**
- The Eurozone recovery, to the extent that it exists, is predicated upon the EU as a whole running an export surplus against the RoW
- **Results:** Demand is external and fragile
- Sets different European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ against each other
POLITICAL RISK: POLITICS IN A DEFLATION
There is a risk that the euro area is shifting from the targeted equilibrium to the deflationary equilibrium in which Japan became mired. The ECB has acted remarkably slowly to address this risk...

Where were we – and where we are now...

**Inflation: The Debtor’s Paradise of the 1970s**
- Positive Inflation
- Labor’s share of national income at all time high
- Corporate profits at all time low
- Unions Strong
- Low Inequality
- National Markets
- Finance Weak, Central Banks Weak, Parliaments strong

**Deflation: The Creditor’s Paradise of today**
- Secular disinflation
- Capital’s share at all time high, Labor at low point
- Collapse in wages
- Unions Weak
- Inequality high
- Globalized Markets
- Finance Strong, Central Banks Strong, Parliaments weak
Collective Action Under Inflation and Deflation

Inflationary Politics: Kalecki’s Warning

• Capital’s interests clear
• Labor on defensive and fragmented
• Neoliberal offensive at level of ideas and institutions
• State weakened, Finance Ascendant

• **Result:** Reagan, Thatcher, Blair, Cameron, Merkel

Deflationary Politics: Polanyi’s Revenge

• Fallacy of Composition at the level of interest formation
• Anti-Creditor coalitions led by the state
• Creditor-Debtor stand-offs at the level of the state (domestic austerity) and internationally (EZ Crisis)

• **Result:** FN, Podemos, Syriza, SNP, Sinn Fein, UKIP, UK Labour
Deflation and Democracy: Who Wins and Who Loses in a Deflation?

Losers

- **Creditors**: Real value of debt goes up but ability to collect goes down

- **Center Left Parties**: Vote share collapsing, new parties as mortal threat (Syriza bashing from the Left, Corbyn Phobia)

Winners

- **Debtors**: Can’t pay - Won’t pay – will vote

- **Populist and Nationalist Parties**: Renationalizing markets, anti-austerity coalitions
So what’s the Inflationary Outlook for Europe?

![Inflation Rates 2009-2014, selected countries](chart)

Source: Eurostat
And what that looks like for the Eurozone as a whole...
ECONOMIC RISK: LET’S EVERYONE RUN AN EXPORT SURPLUS!
Welcome to the post-crisis Eurozone export complex

EZ has a record trade surplus in last quarter of €26.4 billion

Germany, of course, has €24 billion of that surplus

But that’s also a bit misleading...

What really matters is who is importing what into the German supply chain...
The ‘New Europe’ of Export Parts-Supply, into Germany and out into the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Total Exports</th>
<th>By Category (Vehicles, Bodies, Parts and Accessories)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic: 32 percent</td>
<td>Czech Republic: 32 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria: 29 percent</td>
<td>Austria: 34 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland: 26 percent</td>
<td>Poland: 32 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary: 27 percent</td>
<td>Hungary: 39 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia: 20 percent</td>
<td>Slovenia: 28 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia: 22 percent</td>
<td>Slovakia: 27 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania: 19 percent</td>
<td>Romania: 27 percent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A FEW SUGGESTIVE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CHARTS
Central European Deficits become Surpluses

**Czech Republic 2008-2015**

[Graph showing the Czech Republic's current account balance from 2008 to 2015.]

**Hungary 2008-2015**

[Graph showing Hungary's current account balance from 1990 to 2015.]

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
Central European Exports overtake Imports

Czech Republic 2008-2015

Hungary 2008-2015
And of course, where do these exports end up?

Germany

**Germany’s Imports from the Czech Republic**

**Germany’s Imports from Hungary**

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
National Net Income from Abroad Positions Reversing? Germany
National Net Income from Abroad Positions Reversing? Czech Republic and Hungary

Czech Republic

![Graph showing National Net Income from Abroad Positions for Czech Republic]

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream

Hungary

![Graph showing National Net Income from Abroad Positions for Hungary]

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
Which suggests that the rebuilding of the Part Suppliers’ capital stock has been completed.

Czech Republic

Hungary
What do we See here?

• Central Europe used to run chronic deficits, now these countries are all running surpluses

• This is because they were (in part) rebuilding their capital stocks and integrating into the Greater European Export Complex

• That export complex is now active

• **Key Question:** What does this mean for recovery of the region as a whole?
Problem: Export led Recoveries in a currency union Have Asymmetric Costs and Benefits

• One part of the EZ (Germany and Central European part suppliers) runs perma-surpluses, and are external demand dependent economies with (mainly) low tax and transfer regimes.

• The other part (France, Italy, especially) are large domestic demand driven economies with high taxes and transfers that don’t rely on exports and can’t do this without massive internal price adjustments.
Why Export led Recoveries Have Asymmetric costs

So what happens when you put these very different varieties of capitalism in a fiscal compact and common currency that disallows deficits for corresponding surpluses?

- You can’t inflate or devalue to adjust
- You can’t default
- So all you can do is internal devaluation – AKA – *permanent austerity* – to adjust to someone else’s surplus
Four Concerns going Forward

First: Is the EU ‘Asia 1999’ Redux?
If this is structural, it’s hard to go back to running deficits if your basic economic institutions are geared to run a surplus.

Second: A Recovery for Whom?
What happens when one part of the EZ has to contract to balance the other half’s surpluses? The consequent deflationary effects will destroy their center, especially center-left, parties.

Third: Bond Market Effects?
The Fed can raise short-end rates, but if this adds to a global surplus of S > I, long dated Euro maturities may be negative for a long time since they are substitute assets.

Fourth: The Big One: Fragility
Europe developed this model because its export sectors post 2008 were able to ride on other people’s stimulus (US and China). If these countries slow down, fail, or raise rates, what happens to this model?
The Take Home

• Coming up with ‘Policies to Avert Stagnation’ is not the problem

• The problem is that one half of the EZ has a new growth model that is parasitic against the other half

• Add to that a background of structural deflation made worse by these policies, and the political space for good policies that sustain the EZ is narrowing