Profits and markups during the post-Covid inflation shock in the U.S.: A firm-level lens

Leila Davis (University of Massachusetts Boston)

FMM Conference October 2023

Two pieces of context

1. A post-Covid inflation shock that has come with rising profits.

2000 Billions of 2017 dollars 1000 1500 500 2005a1 2010a1 2015a1 2020a1 Nonfinancial profits after IVA and CCA Nonfinancial profits after IVA

Total nonfinancial profits (2001q1-2023q2)

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Two pieces of context

- 2. A long-term rise in market power.
 - The aggregate markup rises to almost 70% by 2016 (De Loecker et al, 2020).
 - Top firms:
 - Make an outsized contribution to rising markups (De Loecker et al, 2020); profit margins (Davis and de Souza, 2023).
 - Superstars (Autor et al, 2020).
 - Rising corporate concentration.
 - Negative and falling profits at bottom of the distribution (Davis and de Souza, 2022).

Profit inflation

Profits have driven the bulk of inflation, not wages:

- Sellers' inflation (Weber and Wasner, 2023).
- In a period of profit inflation, markups are constant or rising despite cost shocks (Nikiforos and Grothe, 2023).

Profit inflation

Profits have driven the bulk of inflation, not wages:

- Sellers' inflation (Weber and Wasner, 2023).
- In a period of profit inflation, markups are constant or rising despite cost shocks (Nikiforos and Grothe, 2023).
- Rising market power after 1980 set the stage for firms' ability to pass on cost shocks during the pandemic.
 - As firms protect their markups, workers bear the burden of adjustment.

Profit inflation

Profits have driven the bulk of inflation, not wages:

- Sellers' inflation (Weber and Wasner, 2023).
- In a period of profit inflation, markups are constant or rising despite cost shocks (Nikiforos and Grothe, 2023).
- Rising market power after 1980 set the stage for firms' ability to pass on cost shocks during the pandemic.
 - As firms protect their markups, workers bear the burden of adjustment.
- What has happened with firm markups?

This presentation

Five main patterns:

- 1. In the aggregate, firms maintained pre-pandemic markups in 2020-22.
- 2. A long-term reallocation of sales to high-markup firms reverses in 2020.
- 3. Markups rise at the top *and* bottom of the distribution.
- 4. Low-markup firms in 2019 see the biggest gains in 2020-22.
- 5. 'Systemically important' industries play a substantive role, as well as 'downstream' sectors.

This presentation

Five main patterns:

- 1. In the aggregate, firms maintained pre-pandemic markups in 2020-22.
- 2. A long-term reallocation of sales to high-markup firms reverses in 2020.
- 3. Markups rise at the top *and* bottom of the distribution.
- 4. Low-markup firms in 2019 see the biggest gains in 2020-22.
- 5. 'Systemically important' industries play a substantive role, as well as 'downstream' sectors.

Takeaways?

- Firms have been able to pass on (rather than absorb) cost shocks.
- Early evidence that:
 - Bottom firms had a new ability to raise markups.
 - Spread to 'downstream' sectors.

Firm data

Sample:

- Compustat data, 1950-2022.
- Listed U.S. non-financial firms.
 - I exclude foreign private issuers (approx 1/3 of sample since 2010s).

Markup:

- Over cost of goods sold, following De Loecker et al (2020).
 - See also Konczal and Lusiani (2022), Nikiforos and Grothe (2023).
- Similar qualitative patterns for other measures of the markup, the profit margin.

The aggregate markup



Rises from an avg. of 1.24 in the 1970s to 1.60 in 2021.



The aggregate markup



A reallocation to high-sales firms?

The aggregate markup can rise because of:

- Rising markups within firms.
- A reallocation of economic activity (sales) towards high-markup firms.
- Entry & exit.

Over the long-term:

- ► Key role for reallocation effect i.e. high-markup firms get bigger.
- Reverses after 2020.



A reallocation to high-sales firms?



A reallocation to high-sales firms?



What offsets the falling market share component after 2020?

- In 2021, some (small) within-firm increase in markups.
- In 2022, early evidence suggests entry.

The markup distribution



Above-median markups continue to rise after 2019.

The markup distribution



- Above-median markups continue to rise after 2019.
- Suggestive evidence of rising markups at very bottom?



Prior market power and post-2020 markups

Do prior markups play a role in post-2020 firm behavior?

- ► I rank firms by pre-pandemic markups & track over time.
- Early evidence suggests low-markup firms did some 'catching up'.

Prior market power and post-2020 markups

Do prior markups play a role in post-2020 firm behavior?

- I rank firms by pre-pandemic markups & track over time.
- Early evidence suggests low-markup firms did some 'catching up'.



Average markups, based on 2019 markup distribution

Sector: systemically important firms

- Over the long-term, markup growth is driven by within-sector changes.
 - Rather than structural change.
- After 2019, markup growth is concentrated in 'systemically-important industries'.
 - Industries from Weber, Jauregui, Teixeira, and Pires (2022).

Sector: systemically important firms

- Over the long-term, markup growth is driven by within-sector changes.
 - Rather than structural change.
- After 2019, markup growth is concentrated in 'systemically-important industries'.
 - Industries from Weber, Jauregui, Teixeira, and Pires (2022).

Contribution of systemically important industries to change in markup

Year	Aggregate markup	Annual change in markup	System imp sectors	Non-system imp sectors
2019	1.581	0.0081	-0.0008	0.0089
2020	1.577	-0.0038	-0.0121	0.0083
2021	1.597	0.0196	0.0313	-0.0117
2022	1.589	-0.0076	0.0214	-0.0290

Decomposition

Sectoral contributions



Sectoral contributions



Conclusions

Firm markups point to profit inflation:

- Steady aggregate markups after 2019 show that firms could insulate themselves from pandemic-period cost shocks.
- With markup growth among certain groups of firms:
 - At the top (90th) percentile in 2020/21...
 - ... but also evidence that *low* markup firms disproportionately raised markups.
 - 'Systemically important' sectors. Within 'downstream' sectors.

Looking forward:

- Did historically low-markup firms take advantage of confusion & disruption to raise prices?
- Markups *within* non-systemically-important sectors rise in 2021-22.
- Do firms 'return' markups when moments of disruption end?

Thank you!

Appendix slides

Foreign private issuers



Return

The aggregate markup, FIRE

Aggregate markup: with and without FIRE





The aggregate markup over total costs

Accounting for general and administrative expense?



Definitions:

- Variable costs: cost of goods sold.
- ► Total costs: cost of goods sold + general & administrative expense.



The aggregate profit margin



Profit margin from Davis and de Souza (2022):

- Profit margin = total profits to sales.
- Profits are (net) operational and nonoperational income, after tax.

Return

The markup distribution



Percentiles of the markup distribution, 2019 = 1 (2019-2022)



The profit rate distribution

Percentiles of the profit rate distribution



- Profit rate = total profits relative to total assets (Davis and de Souza, 2022).
- Percentiles of unweighted distribution.



Shift-share decomposition

I extend the firm decomposition from De Loecker, Eekhout and Unger (2020) through 2022:

$$\Delta \mu_{t} = \underbrace{\sum_{i} m_{i,t-1} \Delta \mu_{i,t}}_{Within-firm \text{ component}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i} \tilde{\mu}_{i,t-1} \Delta m_{i,t}}_{Market share \text{ component}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i} \Delta \mu_{i,t} \Delta m_{i,t}}_{Cross \text{ term}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Entering}} \mu_{i,t}^{Z} m_{i,t}}_{Entry} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exiting}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Exit} \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Entering}} \mu_{i,t} m_{i,t}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Exit} \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{Net \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{NEt \text{ entry}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i \in \text{Exit}} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1} m_{i,t-1}}_{NET \text{ entry}} +$$

Systemically important sectors

Based on BEA crosswalk to NAICS codes.

List of industries with observation counts for 2019-2022.

Industry	# firms	Ν
Petroleum and coal products	65	11,825
Oil and gas extraction	341	11,825
Farms	24	11,825
Food, beverage, and tobacco products	302	11,825
Chemical products	1,844	11,825
Housing	0	11,825
Utilities (excluded)	0	11,825
Wholesale trade	473	11,825
Total	3,049	11,825



Shift-share decomposition





Sectoral breakdown, 2-digit industries



Return